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Interpreting Recent Developments in 
Myanmar as an Attempt to Establish Political 
Legitimacy
N. Ganesan
Myanmar is currently undergoing widespread changes that are transforming 
the country’s political and socio-economic landscape. These changes include the 
newly promulgated Constitution that was ratified in 2008 and a national election 
held in November 2010. Additionally, by-elections in April 2012 saw the return to 
Parliament of the National League for Democracy and its leader Aung San Suu Kyi. 
The reforms under the new Thein Sein-led government include a congenial working 
relationship with the political opposition, freeing political prisoners and the granting 
of amnesty to political exiles to encourage their return, the negotiation of ceasefire 
agreements with almost all of the ethnic insurgent armies, and the inauguration 
of the Myanmar Peace Centre as a vehicle for the resolution of domestic conflict. 
These and related reforms are designed to secure the government’s internal and 
external political legitimacy which it has lacked since the fall of the previous socialist 
government in 1988.
Keywords  Myanmar, democratization, political reforms, political legitimacy, Aung  
                       San Suu Kyi
Introduction
This article examines the changes that have taken place in Myanmar since 
the November 2010 national election.1 It seeks to take stock of the major 
achievements of the government as well as the challenges that lie ahead for 
the country. Although the new government has earned itself much goodwill 
both domestically and internationally with its major efforts at political reform 
and reconciliation there remain serious challenges that will take time to solve. 
Consequently, the ongoing efforts of the new government led by President Thein 
Sein are very much a work in progress. 
The central argument of the article is that both internally and externally the 
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previous military government lacked political legitimacy. Political legitimacy 
is defined here simply as a government having widely recognized sovereign 
authority and the absence of significant contestation of such authority. 
Additionally, in line with international practice, a sovereign government retains 
the exclusive right to the use of force. For Myanmar, the lack of such legitimacy 
is a historical problem inherited from the socialist government that collapsed 
in 1988. The government’s political legitimacy since the time of independence 
has been challenged by an active Communist insurgency and a motley crew of 
drug warlords (Tin 2007, 315). Besides, from the very outset, the nation-state, 
as it was constituted at the time of political independence in 1948, was deeply 
contested by various ethnic minority groups each with its own conception of 
legitimacy (Steinberg 2007, 109). The 2010 election, therefore, provided the 
previous military government with a window of opportunity to change the 
country’s political and economic orientation in an attempt to secure broad-based 
legitimacy. It was also the culmination of a process that the military claimed it 
had undertaken since 1993 when it first unveiled a roadmap to democracy. The 
decision of the current government to deeply engage and work with the political 
opposition is a significant break from the practices of the previous government 
that was scornful of Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD), 
regarding them as a proxy for Western interests and ambitions. Conveniently, 
the reforms undertaken thus far and the widespread international approval they 
have received also negate the necessity to hold the previous military government 
responsible for any excesses that it may have committed and which, in fact, had 
resulted in international sanctions against the regime. 
Organizationally, this article is divided into four major sections. The first 
section briefly examines the country’s historical legacy in order to place the 
discussion within a contextual perspective. The second section then details the 
reforms that the government has undertaken, while the third identifies the major 
challenges that still lie ahead. The fourth section looks at the political possibilities 
towards the end of the current government’s term in 2015 and attempts to plot 
possible trajectories into the future.
Historical Legacy
Burma, as the country was called until 1989, was colonized by the British as an 
extension of their imperial economic interests in India. The country fought three 
wars during its resistance against colonial occupation.2 The British acquired 
control of the entire country in 1886 after the conclusion of the Third Anglo-
Burmese War, and went on to rule the country until independence was granted 
shortly after the Second World War in 1948.3 For most of the colonial period 
the country was ruled from India and colonial policy and administration of the 
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country was piecemeal (Taylor 1987, 69; 2007, 73; 2009, 70-1). In fact, the British 
only administered the lowland plains that came to be called Ministerial Burma. 
The highlands or frontier areas that were inhabited by ethnic minority groups 
were too difficult to access on account of dense forestation and the threat of 
malaria. Conveniently, such groups were dealt with through treaties that allowed 
them to retain a good measure of autonomy, and in a worst case scenario some of 
these groups were allowed to secede from the political union under the Panglong 
Agreement of 1947 (Taylor 1987, 286; 2009, 288; Steinberg 2006; 2007, 114).4 
At the time of independence, there were a number of immediate political 
problems that confronted the country. One of the most significant of these 
was the country’s heterogeneous ethno-linguistic population. The British had 
documented the presence of some 135 ethnic groups prior to the outbreak of the 
Second World War. The independence leader Aung San had managed to placate 
many of the minority groups with liberal political arrangements. Subsequent 
elites, however, were unable to hold the peace, and shortly after independence 
many of the ethnic groups that were disproportionately represented within 
the military broke off and formed their own insurgent armies. The British 
recruitment of ethnic highland minorities was driven by their preference for 
“martial races,” which were regarded as more suitable for soldiering, and their 
deep distrust of the Bamar majority that had sided with the Japanese during the 
Occupation and had fought against the British and their allies (Thawnghmung 
2008, 5; Ganesan 2010, 3). Of the approximately 26 ethnic insurgent armies, the 
largest were those who represented the Karen, Kachin, and the Shan (Smith 1991; 
1999). 
The second major problem that confronted the new government was the 
presence of a large detachment of Chinese soldiers from the Kuomintang who 
were trapped in the Shan states during their conflict with Chinese Communist 
troops. The former were supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency while 
the latter were supported by the Chinese government (Ganesan 2005, 36; 2010, 4; 
2011, 99). The Burmese government was unable to control this conflict that raged 
within its borders until the 1960s. An added complication was the fight between 
the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) and the elected government. Collectively, 
the newly independent state suffered from a legitimacy crisis right from the 
outset.
In light of these challenges and the weak structural and enforcement 
capacity of the government, the domestic political situation deteriorated rapidly. 
In 1959, the Burmese military staged its first coup against an unstable elected 
government and acted in a caretaker capacity for six months. The second coup 
was staged in 1962 against the U Nu government and military rule lasted much 
longer—until 1988 (Maung 1981, 9; Taylor 2009). During that period the military 
strongman Ne Win headed the country and rule was exercised through the 
Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) that was formed after the coup. The 
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regime also practiced a foreign policy of neutrality attained through isolationism. 
Consequently, from 1962 onwards Burma cut itself off from the rest of the world 
and practiced a policy of self-sufficiency that significantly weakened the country’s 
economy and infrastructural capacity (Ganesan 2005, 32; 2010, 4-5; Haacke 2006, 
10; Steinberg 2001; Taylor 2009, 355-56). 
The collapse of the BSPP government in 1988 occurred at a time when a 
number of other developments were taking place simultaneously. These included 
the implosion and collapse of the BCP that in turn led to the formation of two 
more insurgent armies representing the Wa and the Kokang. The collapse also 
coincided with widespread demonstrations led by students calling for democracy 
which were violently put down by the government (Kyaw 2008; 2011). And 
finally, this was also the time when Aung San Suu Kyi returned to Burma to care 
for her ailing mother. This confluence of events had a major impact on domestic 
developments and led to the military’s initial agreement to implement democratic 
reforms and nationwide elections in 1990 in order to secure political legitimacy. 
Suu Kyi’s NLD won a landslide victory in the elections, but the outcome was 
subsequently ignored by the military government because it had sought to 
buttress its own political legitimacy through an election victory. From 1990 
onwards, Suu Kyi was periodically detained and the NLD was heavily scrutinized 
and harassed. The government’s denial of victory to the NLD, regular detention 
of opposition politicians, and the large number of political prisoners deeply 
undermined its political legitimacy, both at home and abroad. 
In order to stabilize the domestic political situation the military junta signed 
ceasefire agreements with some 20 ethnic insurgent groups which were then 
allowed to retain control of a designated contiguous territory while retaining 
their weapons (Smith 1991; 1999; Steinberg 2006).5 The government also had to 
serve notice to those groups if it chose to enter these areas. On the other hand, it 
mounted major military offensives against groups that did not sign such ceasefire 
agreements. The military government also embarked on a series of reform 
initiatives with the aim of enhancing its political legitimacy, at least domestically. 
In 1997, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which had ruled 
the country from 1988, underwent a name change and called itself the State 
Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The government then embarked on a 
National Convention, first announced in 1993, that drew in the country’s different 
ethnic and interest groups to write a New Constitution. This process was in turn 
part of a seven point “roadmap to democracy” introduced in 2003 (Holliday 
2011, 82). The Constitution that was subsequently crafted and announced in May 
2008 was eventually ratified through a public referendum shortly afterwards, 
and it now serves to guide the country’s institutions (Taylor 2009, 487). Many of 
the ethnic insurgent groups and the NLD refused to participate in the National 
Convention, and there were widespread allegations of voter fraud during the 
referendum for approval of the Constitution that was held against the backdrop 
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of the devastation wrought by Cyclone Nargis earlier the same year. The 2010 
elections were then held based on the 2008 Constitution and the government’s 
mass-based party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), won a 
landslide victory. The NLD refused to run in the elections although a breakaway 
faction, the National Democratic Front, did participate. 
The broader international community was also not persuaded by the 
junta’s roadmap and partial political changes. Member countries of the regional 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had always remained engaged 
with Myanmar even though they were unable to persuade the military regime 
to undertake reforms. In fact, in the early 1990s, Thailand proposed a policy 
of more robust and flexible engagement with the Myanmar government—a 
policy initiative that did not win support from the other ASEAN members and 
eventually petered out (Narine 2002, 195; Haacke 2003, 172-77). Consequently, 
many elites in ASEAN were disillusioned with the negative publicity that the 
membership of Myanmar brought to the organization after 1997 (Roberts 2010, 
234-35; Weatherbee 2009, 300-01). 
The elected government of 2010 is predominantly led by senior military 
officers. The SPDC’s most senior officers, Generals Than Shwe and Maung Aye, 
retired from politics and turned over power to Thein Sein who currently serves as 
President of the country. Most of the ministers in the cabinet are drawn from the 
military and are effectively soldiers in mufti. In August 2011, Thein Sein made a 
conciliatory gesture to Suu Kyi by inviting her to the new administrative capital 
of Naypyitaw for a meeting on economic reforms. Most observers attribute the 
good relationship between the President and Suu Kyi to this meeting when she 
was very well treated in a collegial manner elevating her status with government 
officials (Kyaw 2012, 1-3). The idiosyncratic gestures of Thein Sein and his 
sincerity in moving the country forward are said to have made a deep impression 
on Suu Kyi. Since then, the relationship between the two has been maintained on 
an even keel. And it was on the basis of this meeting and the goodwill that ensued 
that the NLD was subsequently allowed to register as a political party and won 43 
out of 45 seats in the April 2012 by-elections that brought Suu Kyi to parliament.6 
Major Reforms of the New Government
Accommodation of the Political Opposition
The Thein Sein government has undertaken wide-ranging reforms since it was 
elected in 2010. Most of these efforts are aimed at enhancing the government’s 
political legitimacy internally and externally. The process of deflecting and co-
opting domestic challenges to its political legitimacy has earned the government 
broad recognition, including from its strongest detractors. The major political 
achievements include its conciliatory efforts towards the political opposition and 
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the signing of peace treaties with almost all the ethnic insurgent armies. With 
regard to its dealings with the political opposition, the earliest indications of a 
positive relationship between the two parties, after the August 2011 meeting, was 
the government’s decision to allow the NLD to re-register as a political party to 
compete in the 2012 by-elections.
Suu Kyi’s change of heart to compete in the April 2012 by-elections is 
significant since it brought the government and the NLD closer together in terms 
of finding a political solution to the previous impasse. This was no mean feat since 
it was widely known that Than Shwe deeply disliked Suu Kyi, and many senior 
members of the SPDC regarded her as a traitor for urging the West to impose and 
maintain sanctions on Myanmar (Kyaw 2012). Her marriage to British academic 
Michael Aries and the fact that her two sons carried British citizenship also 
worked in her disfavor. 
There is an extremely strong xenophobic undercurrent in the country’s 
psyche, especially within the military that has always regarded itself as the 
champion of the country’s freedom (Callahan 2004). At the popular level, this 
xenophobia was expressed in terms of riots against the Chinese and Indian 
migrant communities in the 1960s. The British colonial period witnessed liberal 
immigration into Burma and the new migrants were far more successful socio-
economically. Furthermore, the Indians were often favored by the colonial 
authorities for administrative appointments. J. S. Furnivall, in a much cited 
work, argued that British colonial policy in Burma created a plural society only 
superficially since there was no deep understanding between the locals and 
foreigners. Hence the locals only acknowledged others within the framework of a 
market place where different communities gathered for business (Furnivall 1956). 
Consequently, the locals became poor and disadvantaged in their own country 
and this state of relative deprivation fuelled strong xenophobic sentiments at the 
time of political independence in 1948. The isolationist foreign policy pursued by 
the Ne Win government from 1962 to 1988 only worsened the country’s position 
in terms of its dealings with foreign countries and nationals. In light of such 
deeply embedded sentiments against Suu Kyi that were pervasive in the upper 
rungs of the military, Thein Sein’s accommodative approach towards her and the 
NLD was truly revolutionary and an important turning point in the evolution of 
the country’s political situation (Kyaw 2012, 3). 
There have been a number of other political steps undertaken by the Thein 
Sein government that have led to a much more liberal political environment. 
Prior to the by-elections, the government freed a large number of political 
detainees. This was one of the major demands of the political opposition as well 
as Western countries for the lifting of sanctions. These detentions significantly 
weakened the political opposition and held opposition activists in fear for their 
safety and liberty. Such detentions were used not only against members of 
political parties but also against activist groups such as the 88 Generation group 
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that had previously rallied against the government and continues to be popular at 
the ground level. The freeing of political prisoners was clearly seen as a positive 
gesture that called for a positive response, and many Western countries slowly 
began lifting economic sanctions against Myanmar after this decision. Following 
on from the first two large-scale releases in January 2012, there were a total of 
six such releases in 2012, including one on November 19 timed to coincide with 
the visit of U.S. President Barrack Obama. And in the most recent such amnesty 
announced in April 2013 another 93 such prisoners were released (Eleven 
Newsmedia Myanmar April 23, 2013).
Correlated with the decision to free political prisoners was the government’s 
decision to grant a broad based amnesty to political exiles living abroad. A large 
number of exiles, who had previously provided information on developments 
inside the country and organized activities against the military government, were 
living in India, Thailand, and the West. In fact, these groups, and in particular 
those operating out of Thailand, provided much valuable information to the 
outside world regarding domestic political developments in Myanmar on the 
basis of their proximity to the situation and their wide-ranging contacts within 
the country. Chiangmai in Thailand was home to an especially large number 
of exiles. Many of those who had fled the violence in 1988 and joined ethnic 
insurgent armed groups to fight against the government were located in Thailand, 
as was a faction of the influential All Burma Students’ Democratic Front. Whereas 
many from these groups were initially suspicious of the government’s intentions, 
they subsequently relented after hearing positive feedback from early returnees 
(Kyaw 2012). The government in fact has gone out of its way to accommodate 
leading members of the 88 Generation group and has asked for their assistance in 
helping to rebuild the country. It has inducted many exiles into the newly created 
Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) and has sold them heavily subsidized apartments 
as a gesture of gratitude.7 Although many of the exiles now work closely with 
the government, leading members of the 88 Generation group maintain some 
distance from the government in order to retain their independence. They also 
regard themselves to be the true champions of reform, having spent decades 
under harsh imprisonment compared to the exiles. Consequently, there is some 
latent tension between the returned exiles on the one hand and the 88 Generation 
group on the other.
The MPC was inaugurated in October 2012 in Yangon. It currently serves as 
the government’s vehicle for negotiating meetings with the ethnic armed groups 
in order to achieve long-term accommodation and resolve the issue of private 
armed groups operating within the country. The MPC was a joint initiative 
between the government and the Peace Donor Support Group, and in particular 
Norway and the European Union (EU), which have contributed the bulk of 
the pledged funding of $30 million over a five-year period. The government 
donated five large, unused, detached houses that were then renovated and fitted 
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for large-scale meetings and offices for researchers. Important members of the 
government’s Union-level peace negotiating teams were located in the MPC 
and the Centre has served as an important meeting point for official negotiating 
teams. More recently, after the outbreak of religious violence in Meiktila in 
Mandalay Division in March 2013, the MPC has also hosted interfaith dialogue 
meetings and sought to temper the tense relationship between the majority 
Buddhist and minority Muslim communities.
Ceasefire with Ethnic Minority Insurgent Groups 
There are a total of 26 ethnic insurgent armies that had previously fought against 
the BSPP government until its collapse (Smith 1991; 1999).8 Many of these groups 
have been fighting the government for more than five decades, since political 
independence. As a result of the lengthy conflict and the occupation of large land 
areas, these groups have evolved their own political and economic arrangements 
and networks. Many of these groups are often involved in cross-border trade in 
timber and precious stones from the areas under their control. The Myanmar 
government began to sign ceasefire agreements with these groups as early as 
1988 following the collapse of the BCP. The earliest of these agreements were 
signed with the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Myanmar National 
Democratic Alliance (MNDA) that represented the Kokang ethnic group. 
Both groups were previously the sword arms of the BCP and the government 
was anxious to contain the situation following the collapse of Ne Win’s BSPP 
government (Steinberg 2001). Both groups also operated close to the Chinese 
border, and the UWSA had acquired notoriety as a major supplier of natural and 
synthetic drugs in the region and beyond (Chin 2009, 222-24; Roberts 2010, 84-
6). The MNDA was routed by the military following a conflict in 2007 despite an 
existing ceasefire agreement. Chinese intelligence sources suggest that pressure 
was brought to bear on the Myanmar military to attack the MNDA after Kokang 
manufactured weapons were traced in Tibet and other restive areas in China. 
As for the Wa, at the present time, they are the largest of the ethnic armies after 
having commissioned a fourth brigade in Pangsang in 2010 (Ganesan 2011, 108). 
The Myanmar government’s approach in dealing with the ethnic armies is 
to sign an initial ceasefire agreement. This agreement would respect the groups’ 
right to control clearly demarcated areas and continue bearing arms. It is hoped 
that afterwards, through an admixture of negotiations for political rights and 
accompanying development in the region, the armies would be disbanded. 
The government’s original plan under the SPDC was to demobilize the soldiers 
from these groups and have them join a Border Guard Force (BGF) that had 
elements of both the regular army as well as ethnic insurgents. However, the 
government has only had limited success with the scheme. The larger groups, and 
in particular the Kachin, Karen, Shan, and Wa, have rejected it outright and the 
government is trying to find new ways to solve the situation (South 2008, 11). 
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Major areas of disagreement over the scheme include the ratio of government 
troops to that of ethnic militia groups, and command and control over the units 
at the battalion level and higher. In February 2011, a total of 11 ethnic armed 
ceasefire groups formed the United Nationalities Federal Council in order to 
collectively coordinate their position with the government. These include the 
Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Shan 
State Army-North (SSA-N), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), Chin 
National Front (CNF), Karen National Union (KNU), and five smaller groups 
representing the Lahu, Arakan, Pa-O, Palaung, and a splinter Wa group (Tin 
2013, 6).
Notwithstanding these difficulties, 2012 has been an especially good year for 
government negotiators. For the first time they have managed to persuade three 
groups that previously had no dealings with the government to sign ceasefire 
agreements. These agreements serve as a precursor to direct negotiations with 
the government on political, economic, and social matters. The largest of these 
groups is the KNU and the agreement is still holding. The other two groups are 
the CNF and the Revolutionary Council of the Shan States (RCSS) (Kyaw 2012, 
6).9 Such agreements normally involve preliminary local negotiations. These are 
then followed by agreements at the regional level before they are finally submitted 
for ratification to Parliament at the Union level. After all the groups have formally 
entered ceasefire arrangements, the government intends to host a Naypyitaw 
Conference. These agreements have not come without very strong commitment 
on the part of the government and the able leadership exercised by the lead 
negotiators of the two government-appointed teams. Especially significant in 
this regard is the role played by U Aung Min, the former Minister of Railways 
Transportation, who has often crossed borders to hold preliminary negotiations 
in China and Thailand. Their direct appointment by President Thein Sein and 
their conciliatory approach have won them much leeway and goodwill from the 
ethnic armed groups who, with rare exceptions, have gone on to sign ceasefire 
agreements (Kyaw 2012).
Strengthened Civil Society 
Another major development in Myanmar politics has been the active role of civil 
society organizations that have undertaken wide ranging activities, from political 
education to providing relief for those affected by natural calamities (Kyaw 
2007a, 161; 2007b). The previous military government was suspicious of such 
organizations for fear they would serve as beachheads for foreign interference 
in the country’s domestic politics and sought to suppress them (South 2008, 
5; Callahan 2008, 52). The military was particularly suspicious of civil society 
organizations that received foreign support and funding (Kyaw 2008). That 
view began to change after the devastation wrought by Cyclone Nargis and the 
overwhelming task of dealing with the death and destruction. Some of the earliest 
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groups to successfully provide aid were religious organizations, monasteries, 
and civil society organizations. Given the government’s suspicion of foreign 
aid agencies, external donors were forced to deal with domestic civil society 
organizations at the outset, before ASEAN and UN agencies were given greater 
access. 
One of the most successful of such organizations at that time was 
Myanmar Egress. It won the trust of the government and undertook relief 
and reconstruction work through its large alumni network composed of those 
who had attended its social science and entrepreneurship training classes. The 
board of Egress has also had a good working relationship with the government, 
and its non-confrontational methods have won it wide recognition.10 Foreign 
aid donors leveraged their resources using the organization and were able to 
undertake much more meaningful work. Even UN agencies and ASEAN worked 
with Egress to deliver aid to the delta areas. In this regard, one of the more 
positive developments that came in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis was the 
easier availability of external funding and the strengthening of local civil society 
organizations that arose to meet the challenge. As a result of their success, they 
were also able to attract a lot of funding from international aid agencies such 
as the UNDP, Ausaid, DFID (UK government), and Oxfam. Many German 
foundations and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA) were early providers of financial support in spite of Western sanctions. 
Some of these agencies were unable to utilize banking facilities in Myanmar and 
so worked through banks in Singapore and Thailand for the disbursement of 
funds.
Liberalizing Media
Other major changes under the new government are sweeping reforms of 
the mass media industry (Kyaw 2012). In the past there were very strict press 
censorship laws and the authorities often had to directly clear what appeared in 
print. As a result of such scrutiny, the major daily English language newspapers 
were only the government-sponsored and propagandistic New Light of 
Myanmar and the Myanmar Times. The former was especially notorious for 
publicizing government pronouncements and regularly featured articles on the 
accomplishments of the military, in particular in the areas of agricultural and 
infrastructural development. The Myanmar Times was much more commercially 
oriented, although it was subject to strict censorship as well. Then there were 
weekly journal-type magazines that were also heavily censored. Censorship rules 
were strict and entire articles could be ruled out of line and journalists imprisoned 
or subjected to other sanctions. Hence the community of reporters tended to 
err on the side of safety. However, the Thein Sein government has lifted press 
censorship and the mass media operates freely now. In fact, Thailand’s Nation 
Media Group was one of the first to make a foray into the Myanmar market and 
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now publishes the Eleven Newsmedia Myanmar which has credible articles on 
domestic developments. This new freedom means that information is now widely 
available and shared, and as a result the government has been subjected to far 
greater scrutiny. There are even investigative pieces that sometimes put senior 
government officials on the defensive, such as recent reports regarding the illegal 
confiscation of land by senior military officers.11 
When appraising the performance of the current government it needs to 
be borne in mind that it has only been functioning for a little over two years, 
since November 2010. The enormity of the task confronting the government 
is truly staggering. Even at this time the state does not have full control over 
all the country’s territory and people. The country’s infrastructure is weak and 
dilapidated and there are no formal laws in many areas, and where these exist they 
are easily bypassed. Six decades of mismanagement has truly made the country 
very weak in gearing itself for the challenges that lie ahead in the path towards 
reconstruction. Nonetheless there is significant political will at the leadership 
level in addressing the issues directly, and the international community has also 
offered much support and aid. 
The Immediate Challenges That Lie Ahead
There are a large number of problems that require the attention of the current 
government of Myanmar. Some of these are more important than others since 
they impinge on the core functions of governance—the provision of safety and 
security for the inhabitants of the state. Two issues stand out in this regard. The 
first of these is the resumption of hostilities between the military and Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA) in Kachin state, and the second is the outbreak of 
violence in Rakhine state and more recently in Mandalay Division. Whereas the 
former involves actual military conflict the latter can be more correctly described 
as a communal conflict that has pitted two different ethno-religious communities 
against each other. Nonetheless, both of these developments have tremendous 
potential to undermine the political legitimacy that the current government has 
sought to amass.
The KIA previously had a ceasefire agreement with the government that 
unfortunately broke down in mid-2011. The insurgent army has a troop strength 
of approximately 8,000 and it is deployed in Kachin state that shares a long border 
with China. Both sides have blamed the other for the collapse of the truce. The 
common KIA complaint is that the military is attempting to retake ground that 
the KIA has previously controlled, and in particular, strategic high ground. The 
government on the other hand has accused the KIA of attempting to seize more 
neutral areas and of targeting government soldiers with snipers. More recently, in 
December 2012, there was a serious escalation of the conflict following the KIA’s 
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refusal to vacate an area after it was served notice by the military. Consequently, 
shortly after Christmas, government forces used helicopter gunships and aircraft 
to bomb KIA positions. The government’s spokesperson publicly denounced the 
KIA for blowing up railway lines and more than 10 bridges, and for targeting the 
power grid in Kachin state, actions that the military has said are unacceptable.12 
The KIA, on the other hand, has accused the government of indiscriminate 
firing that threatens the lives of civilians under their control. There are now 
approximately 100,000 internally displaced persons in government-controlled 
refugee camps and another 55,000 in areas controlled by the KIA. The latter 
is headquartered in Laiza near the border with China, and there have been 
reports of shells landing on the Chinese side where approximately 5,000 refugees 
are camped. China is keen to see the situation resolved peacefully to avoid 
threatening Chinese security in bordering Yunnan Province which typically 
bears the brunt of spillovers from border conflict (Ganesan 2010, 8-9; 2011, 
108-09).13 In the recent round of negotiations conducted in Ruili, in January 
and March 2013, China sent high-ranking representatives from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the military to the meeting to indicate its interest in resolving 
the situation. The meeting was also attended by representatives of the Shan and 
Karen insurgent groups, including the head of the KNU’s military wing. In the 
past, such groups have indicated support for the KIA.
There have been a number of attempts by the government to resolve the 
Kachin situation (Burma Centrum Nederland 2012). In 2012 President Thein 
Sein issued two Executive Orders for the military to halt the fighting, but these 
came to naught. Similarly, civil society groups, and most recently in January 
2013, the Lower House of Parliament have also called for a halt to the fighting. 
An earlier truce in the same month called by the military lasted for only two 
days before fighting resumed. In the meantime, the President has invited the KIA 
to send a delegation to hold peace talks. One of the complaints of the military 
is that the KIA is not serious about negotiating peace and often does not send 
representatives to meetings who have the authority to negotiate arrangements that 
can be effected at the ground level. Early negotiations then suggested that a major 
meeting between the two parties be held in late April 2013 (Eleven Newsmedia 
Myanmar April 18, 2013). The negotiations have now been moved to the 
Myanmar Peace Center with a major meeting scheduled in September. It has also 
been recently revealed that the postponement of a meeting with the KIA in early 
April was due to Chinese objections over the planned presence of representatives 
of the United Nations, the United Sates, and Britain at the meeting, again 
indicative of the significant leverage that China wields in such negotiations (Eleven 
Newsmedia Myanmar April 23, 2013). Meanwhile, the government has granted 
access to international relief aid agencies to assist with humanitarian work in the 
areas under its control. 
The second difficult situation confronting the government is the outbreak 
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of violence between the Rohingya and the Rakhine communities in western 
Rakhine state. There has always been historic animosity between the two 
groups, and successive Myanmar governments have refused to recognize the 
Muslim Rohingyas as native to the country. Instead they are typically referred 
to as Bengali Muslims and have had strict limitations placed on their personal 
freedoms, association, property ownership, and movement (Callahan 2008, 30-3). 
They are often viewed as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and number some 
800,000 in all. In the past, the government’s position has always been that those 
who can demonstrate their family’s domicile status before the outbreak of the 
First Anglo-Burmese War in 1824 will be entitled to citizenship. 
There have been a number of outbreaks of violence between the Rakhine 
Buddhists and the Rohingyas in the past, the one in October 2012 being the most 
recent. Some 190 people were reported to have died in the violence and entire 
villages were razed to the ground. The fighting began with the report of the rape 
of a Rakhine girl by three Rohingya men followed by a revenge attack with the 
burning of a bus carrying Muslim pilgrims that led to the death of 10 victims. 
Subsequently the violence flared across the state and the police and military were 
deployed to keep the peace. This part of Myanmar is difficult to access by road 
and most transport is by boat on the large Nav and Kaladhan rivers. As a result, 
maintaining the peace became a rather challenging and difficult task simply for 
logistical reasons. The Rohingyas appear to have borne the brunt of the violence 
and those who fled their homes and property are currently housed in refugee 
camps near the port city of Sittwe. Many from the community have also chosen 
to flee the country and they regularly land in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 
The issue has strained ties between Myanmar and Bangladesh, with the latter 
refusing entry to would-be refugees, arguing that it already hosts 300,000 persons 
in refugee camps. The violence in Meiktila, in March 2013, was also aimed at 
Muslims and appears to have taken its cue from the situation in Rakhine. During 
this second incident, 43 persons perished and, as with the earlier episode, security 
forces appear to have been complicit in the violence, at least at the outset.
Complicating the situation are recent revelations that the Thai military 
has been involved in the illegal resettlement of Rohingya refugees in Malaysia, 
their preferred destination where they are generally much better treated (The 
Nation January 23, 2013). In January alone, some 600 Rohingyas were rounded 
up along the Thai-Malaysian border in Sadao province, Thailand and another 
approximately 350 arrived by boat to the port city of Ranong in southern 
Thailand. There is some sympathy for the Rohingyas in southern Thailand where 
there is a Muslim majority, although the region has also seen an active insurgency 
since 2004, which complicates the situation. The Thai Fourth Army currently has 
some 50,000 troops deployed in the area and violence is an everyday feature of life 
there. In fact, Mahathir Mohamed, when he was Prime Minister of Malaysia, was 
the first to offer asylum to 20,000 Rohingyas. Given the country’s relative safety, 
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Malay Muslim majority, and ample job opportunities, Malaysia has become a 
choice destination for illegal immigrants from Myanmar in general, and not just 
for the Rohingyas. The plight of the Rohingyas and their persecution in Myanmar 
has attracted much international attention and has also caused regional concerns, 
especially among ASEAN members Indonesia and Malaysia that have Muslim 
majority populations (Nair 1997; Saravanamuttu 2010, 342-44). 
As in the Kachin case, the Myanmar government has allowed international 
relief agencies to become involved in tending to the welfare of the displaced 
Rohingyas. It has also formed a Commission of Enquiry into the violence and is 
expected to make public its findings in April 2013. Additionally, the government 
has decided to build more permanent housing to resettle the Rohingyas, but 
the plan has met with stiff resistance from the local Rakhine community. The 
early site of three islands off the coast of Sittwe has been rejected by the Rakhine 
community. Consequently, given the deep-seated animosity between the two 
communities, the government is likely to face some difficulties in dealing with the 
situation on a more permanent basis.
There are also a number of socio-economic problems that require the 
attention of the government. This includes the reintroduction of educational 
institutions that are in line with regional and international standards. Previous 
governments, beginning with the BSPP government from 1962, ignored 
educational investments, and consequently the standards of general education in 
the country, which were among the best in Southeast Asia in the 1960s, steadily 
eroded over time. Qualified professionals also left the country in droves when the 
government embarked on a program of economic nationalization. Also, following 
the return of the military from 1988 onwards, the situation became even worse. 
The military associated tertiary institutions with the democracy movement that 
it harshly suppressed. Afterwards, educational institutions were decentralized 
and often located in remote areas, and the government kept a sharp watch on the 
major universities in urban areas like Yangon and Mandalay. Syllabi were also 
scrutinized and weakened, and so gradually degrees came to hardly represent 
the training and skill levels that they were associated with. Consequently, there 
is an urgent need to reform the educational sector and invest heavily in its 
infrastructure. The same can be said about investments in roads, railways, and 
heath care. In the past China was Myanmar’s greatest benefactor in infrastructural 
development and the two countries boasted a special relationship that defied 
international sanctions (Ganesan 2010, 7; 2011; Maung 2011).14 That situation 
has now changed and other countries, including Japan, have offered to upgrade 
Myanmar’s infrastructure, and the Singapore government has offered to train the 
country’s civil service. The creation of employment is another urgent challenge 
that the government has to meet, with unemployment rates currently estimated at 
40% of the working population (Eleven Newsmedia Myanmar January 23, 2013).
The government must also introduce an effective legal regulatory framework. 
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Up until now, major transactions often involved those with linkages to the 
government and crony developers who were able to seize land and operate with 
impunity. This framework is important to regulate domestic transactions as well 
as to better entice foreign direct investments into the country. Although much 
interest has been expressed by foreign multinationals and governments, the 
absence of such a framework remains a major hindrance. The implementation of 
rational-legal norms for the conduct of daily life and business transactions will go 
a long way toward laying the framework for other developmental projects. In the 
absence of such a framework personal loyalties and preferences have prevailed, 
and there is often a resort to political influence when there is an impasse, creating 
opportunities for corruption. 
In the economic realm the banking sector needs to be made credible and 
well regulated. Right now most people simply hoard cash, foreign currency, and 
gold rather than place their money in a bank. There is a total absence of trust in 
financial institutions, and loans are typically privately negotiated at 36% interest 
per annum, or 3% per month. Most transactions are in cash and preferably 
in U.S. dollars. All of this needs to change. The government has to roll out a 
credible mechanism for revenue collection and have sizeable financial reserves 
to undertake economic reforms. Fortunately, with the lifting of sanctions, 
international agencies such as the Asian Development Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund have promised technical and developmental assistance. Currently 
there is a very strong rentier mentality within the country and especially in 
the urban areas. Most people try to make the best out of the resources that 
they have, and this has led to an incredible and unsustainable rise in industrial 
and residential property prices and rentals. Hotel room rates in major cities, 
including Yangon, have risen more than 100% in the last year and are now no 
longer competitive in relation to similar offerings in major regional cities such 
as Bangkok, Jakarta, and Kuala Lumpur. The situation became so bad that the 
government introduced a ranking system based on the number of stars for hotels 
and imposed price ceilings. However, hotel operators have easily overcome these 
hurdles by selling directly on the Internet and bypassing local agents. 
Whither from Here: 2015 and Beyond
There is little doubt that Myanmar is currently in the middle of an historical 
conjuncture with path-dependent tendencies that will draw it away from its past 
(Pierson 2004). While the current situation appears to be the culmination of a 
military-inspired roadmap to democracy that began in 1994, the ongoing reforms 
are actually in direct response to a legitimacy deficit that attended the military 
government following the collapse of the previous socialist government in 1988. 
Although the government under President Thein Sein has been consultative 
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and prepared to undertake wide-ranging reforms to move the country forward, 
the challenges are truly colossal. Nonetheless, slow and steady progress is being 
made and there is much domestic and international support for his agenda, 
significantly enhancing the government’s political legitimacy. Many Western 
leaders, including U.S. President Barrack Obama, have visited Myanmar and in 
turn received official delegations from the country. And most recently, the EU 
has announced the lifting of all sanctions against Myanmar with the exception 
of an arms embargo (Channel NewsAsia April 22, 2013). In this regard the Thein 
Sein government’s reform efforts have been well rewarded and this enthusiastic 
international response is likely to move similar efforts further forward. The 
pre-election military elite appears to have truly retired and withdrawn into the 
background, and there is little evidence to suggest otherwise. Consequently, 
the current trajectory of change is likely to continue, barring any unforeseen 
developments.
The largest and most influential domestic player is currently the military. 
It is the most organized actor and has disproportionate resources at its disposal 
in relation to its competitors. Most members of the current cabinet are 
ranking military officers who have simply donned civilian clothes. The mass-
based organization that represents their political interests is the USDP, which 
was simply converted from the previous Union Solidarity and Development 
Association (USDA). In structural terms, the military has a 25% representation 
in the Union government as well as the regional parliaments. The Parliament 
requires an absolute majority of more than 75% in order to amend the 2008 
Constitution, and the military is likely to cast a block vote to veto any prospects of 
such a change. Notably, the document clearly forbids those married to foreigners 
or with children holding foreign passports from holding high executive office, 
and therefore Suu Kyi would clearly be subject to this rule.15 Suu Kyi has lobbied 
to change the constitution to bring it more in line with the wishes of the people 
and has made no secret of the fact that she aspires to be the next president (The 
Japan Times April 18, 2013). Also, the military is not subject to parliamentary 
oversight and controls the ministries of Home Affairs, Defense, and Border 
Areas while maintaining a majority representation of 6 out of 11 members in the 
National Security Council.
Based on the NLD’s and Suu Kyi’s popularity in the April 2012 by-elections, 
it is likely that the NLD will perform spectacularly well in the next national 
election slated for 2015. However, under the current Constitution Suu Kyi cannot 
become president, and attempts to change the Constitution may well prove 
difficult. President Thein Sein and his most trusted ministers have privately 
indicated that they will not serve under an NLD-led government.16 The current 
ranking military officer in the government is Thura Shwe Mann, the Speaker 
of Parliament, who has made his ambitions rather clear. Yet the prospect of an 
electoral victory for him through the USDP is remote and he certainly knows 
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that. In the meantime, it is quite well known that all these leading personalities 
have become rather friendly towards each other, which makes the situation even 
more fluid and raises the possibility of a compromise candidate in order to move 
the country forward (Bangkok Post April 17, 2013; Kyodo News Agency April 18, 
2013). Hence it is indeed possible that someone like President Thein Sein may 
continue as the compromise candidate acceptable to all parties. On the other 
side, there have been blog postings with reliable insider information on domestic 
politics cautioning the general public not to attribute all bad decisions and blame 
to the military. Such anonymous postings are one of the ways that the military, 
and elements within it, often state their position on important matters. In any 
event, beyond all this epiphenomena, an academic colleague remarked that it is 
really the military and the bureaucracy that are providing continuity and holding 
the country together. The large numbers recruited into the military’s officer cadet 
corps in the last decade (up to 2,000 per annum as opposed to the traditional 
120) may well vent their frustrations if the military continues to be sidelined 
and deprived of lucrative placements in the bureaucracy as the political situation 
evolves. Ne Win and Than Shwe were much more careful with such placements 
and deflected the possibility of coup attempts in the past. Similarly, those 
regarded as challenging the corporate military establishment, such as former 
Military Intelligence head General Khin Nyunt, were unceremoniously removed 
from their positions and imprisoned. The failure to deal with the aspirations of 
the large military cohort down the line will certainly raise the specter of a coup.
Whatever the outcome may be in 2015, there are a number of structural 
impediments that stand in the way of Suu Kyi’s aspiration for the country’s 
presidency (Taylor 2009, 498-99). It remains to be seen if and when such 
impediments will be overcome. In any event, two years is a very long time in 
politics, and the dictum that “those who live by the crystal ball may be fated to eat 
glass” holds. The evolving new economic opportunities created will also toss up 
new elite who may well enter the political fray. 
Conclusion
The ongoing changes in Myanmar since the 2010 national election have led to 
a number of positive changes in the country. They have also drawn the country 
away from the kind of military authoritarian rule that obtained in the aftermath 
of the collapse of the BSPP government in 1988. The most significant political 
changes are the accommodation reached between the government and the 
political opposition and exiles on the one hand and the ethnic insurgent armies 
on the other. Both of these developments are important in the country’s political 
transformation, although the reabsorption of the ethnic militias is likely to be 
a longer-term issue fraught with fragilities. These developments have served 
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to confer significant political legitimacy on the current government led by 
President Thein Sein and have addressed the legitimacy deficit that attended 
the government at the time of its election in 2010. In fact, such a deficit was 
already in existence following the collapse of the socialist government in 1988 
and the military’s decision to ignore the outcome of the 1990 election that was 
overwhelmingly won by the NLD. In response, the international community 
has richly rewarded the Thein Sein government and has actively dismantled its 
wide-ranging sanctions regime. Additionally, the engagement with Myanmar has 
deflected the threat of China’s geostrategic gains deriving from its strengthened 
bilateral relationship with the country while it was subjected to isolation and 
sanctions. Nonetheless, major challenges remain with the most immediate ones 
being the containment of the conflict in Kachin state and resettlement of the 
Rohingya refugees from Rakhine state. A transparent legal framework in order 
to move the developmental process forward is also lacking. How the country’s 
politics will shape up leading to the 2015 national election remains difficult to 
predict. 
Notes
1. The country was called Burma from the time of British colonial occupation in the 
nineteenth century and was known to the world as such. In 1989, following the collapse 
of the Burma Socialist Programme Party government, the military junta that called itself 
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), renamed the country Myanmar. 
A number of Western countries, including the U.S. and the UK refused to recognize the 
new name since it implied conferring legitimacy on the SLORC. In this article the name 
of the country is used without any connotative value. In fact the majority of the people in 
the country actually use the new name Myanmar quite readily, and following the lifting of 
Western sanctions since 2012 the name Myanmar has been used more universally.
2. The First Anglo-Burmese War was fought from 1824 to 1826, and the British took 
control of the coastal provinces of Arakan (Rakhine) and Tenasserim (Tanintharyi) after 
that. During the Second War the British annexed Pegu (Pagoh) and replaced the King, 
while during the Third War in 1885 the whole country fell to the British.
3. Although Burma was hardly a unified country, the British decided to grant it early 
independence after India in 1947 as part of the policy of withdrawal East of the Suez 
Canal in recognition of their new and diminished status after the Second World War. 
Many observers also point to the special relationship that existed between Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, the Allied Commander, and the Burmese independence leader, General 
Aung San.
4. The Panglong Agreement was signed by General Aung San in February 1947 and 
promised autonomy to the Chin, Kachin, and Shan peoples in the event that the Union of 
Burma between the lowland and highland territories was unsatisfactory for the minorities.
5. The groups that had officially negotiated peace agreements with the government 
by 2004 were the Kachin Independence Organization, New Democratic Army (Kachin), 
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Palaung State Liberation Organization, Myanmar National Democracy Alliance (Kokang), 
Kachin Defense Army, Myanmar National Solidarity Party (Wa), National Democracy 
Alliance Army – Military Local Administration Committee (Shan/Akhar), Shan State 
Army, Pa-O National Organization, Shan State Nationalities People’s Organization, Mong 
Tai Army, Kayan National Guard, Kayinni National Progressive Party, Kayan New Land 
Party, Kayinni National People’s Liberation Front, and New Mon State Party. The KNU 
concluded a first round of peace talks, but  the ratification of the agreement was delayed 
by the detention of head of Military Intelligence General Khin Nyunt, the architect of the 
agreements in 2004, and the death of its leader Saw Bo Mya in 2006. The agreement was 
eventually signed in 2012.
6. Under the 2008 Constitution, ministerial rank public officials who serve in Naypyitaw 
must have their parliamentary seats filled in a by-election on account of their inability to 
subsequently serve their constituents where they were first elected.
7. An entire apartment block was allocated to some of these returnees and refurbished. 
They were then sold at a cost of $50,000 each, or half the then-prevailing market price.
8. Most of the groups represent the various ethnic nationalities within the country. Some 
of the groups draw from more than one ethnic group, while the larger ethnic groups often 
have more than one insurgent organization. Over the years, some of the larger groups, like 
the KNU and the Shan, have also seen a splintering in their ranks. 
9. The RCSS was also previously known as the Shan State Army–South (SSA-S) and is 
commanded by Colonel Yord Serd. It is a faction from the larger Mong Tai Army of famed 
drug warlord Khun Sa, who surrendered to the government in 1996 in return for amnesty.
10. Of the eight members in the Board, two of them held senior appointments in 
government cooperative organizations and had good linkages with the military. One of 
them also currently serves as the Deputy Chairman of the Union of Myanmar Federation 
of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. As a result of such appointments and linkages 
with members of the military, Myanmar Egress had enviable leeway to undertake broad 
ranging programs. The others were in the main private entrepreneurs who wanted to 
contribute towards developing the country. In recognition of the organization’s important 
role in facilitating political changes, Egress has been given a large plot of land with 
renovated buildings to continue with its educational training. 
11. Early investigations were into land grabs in Rakhine state. Since then there has been 
an attempt to document similar activities in the Ayeryawaddy Division. Over time it is 
likely that such investigations will be extended to the entire country. It remains to be seen 
how the government will eventually deal with this issue. The most recent corruption probe 
by the Bureau of Special Investigation centers on a telecommunications graft scandal 
rumored to involve Thein Tun, the minister who abruptly resigned in late January 2013. 
12. I was privy to this information at the MPC during an interview given to a foreign 
journalist.
13. Interestingly, it was reported that ammunition bearing Chinese markings was 
recovered from the conflict areas by the Myanmar military. A government spokesman 
however dismissed the notion that the Chinese government supports the KIA. Instead he 
alluded to the ammunition coming from Yunnan province.
14. This relationship was often called pauk phaw or one between brothers, although 
leading members of the military were always alert to balancing the relationship with 
neighboring India and Thailand in particular in order to obtain strategic leverage. 
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15. For example, General Myint Swe, who is the chief minister of Rangoon Region, 
was nominated to replace Tin Myint Aung Oo as Vice President in July 2012, but 
was withdrawn on account of this clause for having family members with Australian 
citizenship. So there is precedent for this rule to be invoked against Suu Kyi as well.
16. Private communication from a Presidential adviser, December 2012.
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